Terminations for Convenience as Breach of a Government Contract by Beauregard, Henry G
Boston College Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 3
1-1-1966
Terminations for Convenience as Breach of a
Government Contract
Henry G. Beauregard
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Government Contracts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henry G. Beauregard, Terminations for Convenience as Breach of a Government Contract, 7 B.C.L. Rev.
259 (1966), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol7/iss2/3
TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE AS BREACH
OF A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
HENRY G. BEAUREGARD *
It has long been settled that, while the United States has an
inherent and sovereign power to terminate a government contract,
even though the contractor is not in default, such a termination must
be considered a breach of contract, entitling the contractor to damages.
These include loss of anticipated profits—at least in the absence of a
statute, regulation or contract clause authorizing the termination.'
This is true even though the motive of the Government's contracting
officer is perfectly pioper, such as the lack of further need by the
Government for the supplies covered by the contract.'
The only substantial difference between what a contractor receives
upon a contract termination constituting a breach on the one hand,
and an authorized contract termination not constituting a breach on
the other, is, normally, that in the event the termination is a breach of
contract by the Government, the contractor recovers anticipated
profits, consistent with the usual common law rule of damages for
breach of contract; while in the case of an authorized termination, the
contractor is held to a prescribed formula of compensation which
usually excludes any recovery of anticipated profits.' Current forms
of "Termination for Convenience of the Government" clauses generally
exclude recovery by a terminated contractor of anticipated profits,
though permitting a measure of profit on the work performed prior to
termination. 4
A terminated contractor may have to follow differing procedures
dependent upon whether or not the termination is a breach . 5 If there
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1 United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.). 77 (1869) ; see United States v. Penn
Foundry & Mfg. Co., 337 U.S. 198, 208 (1949); United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338,
343 (1884).
2 In United States v. Behan, ibid., the Government's engineers had determined that
the contract, if carried to completion, as a matter of engineering fact would not
accomplish its objective.
3 United States v. Penn Foundry & Mfg. Co., 337 U.S. 198 (1949).
4 Examples include the clauses found in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR), 32 C.F.R. 8.701, .702, .704, .705 (1965); Federal Procurement Regulations
(FPR), 41 C.F.R. §¢ 1-8.701-03, .704-1, .705-1, -2 (1965); and National Aeronautics
and Space Administration Procurement Regulations (NASA PR)', 41 C.F.R. §§ 18 -8.701 -05
(1965);
5 See Comment, Claims Against the Government—Proposed Administrative Action
to Prevent Dual Consideration, CCH Gov't Cont. Rep. 11 80,421.
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is a statute which authorizes a termination at the sole discretion of
the Government, though the contractor is not in default, and sets a
formula of compensation excluding anticipatory profits, then a termi-
nation under that statute is not a breach and the contractor cannot re-
cover for the loss of anticipatory profits. Sometimes such a statute is
Government-wide, such as the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 6 which,
during its effective period, made any termination of a "war contract,"
other than for default, subject to its terms and its formula for com-
pensation, excluding anticipatory profits.' Sometimes such a statute
applies only to the contracts of a particular department for a particular
time, such as the World War I statute which authorized unconditional
cancellation of Navy contracts, even though not in default, and limited
the terminated contractor to damages excluding anticipatory profits.'
The Post Office has a continuing statute" which has been interpreted
as giving the Postmaster General absolute discretion, with the con-
tractor not being in default, to terminate a mail transportation contract
and thereby hold the contractor to the formula stated in the contract
which excludes anticipatory profits.° It is interesting that the cases
reaching this result have examined alternatively the conduct of the
contracting officer and have found it to be prudent and in the best
interests of the Government, in spite of the harsh economic results to
the contractor.
Most government contracts, however, are governed only by the
Armed Services Procurement Act" or the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Acts of 1949 and 1954 (as amended), 12 neither
of which have any such statutory provisions authorizing termination
6 58 Stat. 649 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
►
 Monolith Portland Midwest Co, v. RFC, 178 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 932, rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 954 (1950). The case had extensive
travel in the federal courts. Following Monolith's exhaustion of administrative remedies,
it brought a second action, basically like the first, resulting in a decision that it was
entitled only to "fair compensation" under the War Mobilization and Reconversion
Act. 95 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1951). This was followed by a finding that a plaintiff
in Monolith's position was not entitled to a jury trial. 102 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Cal.
1952). In a subsequent action on the merits, the RFC prevailed. 128 F. Supp. 824
(S.D. Cal. 1955), judgment vacated, 240 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
921 (1957). This seemingly interminable action finally ended with the granting of a
motion to dismiss by the Administrator of General Services, on grounds that the action
abated for failure to substitute the proper party within twelve months of the "dissolu-
tion" of the RFC. 282 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 926 (1960).
8
 See College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12 (1925).
74 Stat. 688 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 6106 (1964).
1 c1 Miller v. United States, 233 U.S. 1 (1914); Slavens v. United States, 196 U.S.
229 (1905) ; Cornelius v. United States, 348 F.2d 960 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
11 70A Stat. 127-33 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-14 (1964).
12 63 Stat. 378-93 (1949), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-92 (1964); 63 Stat.
393-97 (1949), as amended, 41 U.S.C. - §§ 251-60 (1964):
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solely at the Government's discretion, absent a default by the con-
tractor.
If there is no applicable statute, the question arises whether a
government agency may, by regulation, vest itself with the power to
terminate at any time in its sole discretion, absent a default by the
contractor, and to hold the contractor to a formula of compensation
which excludes anticipatory profits. The answer to this question is
possibly in the affirmative if such a regulation not only antedates the
contract involved but possesses as well the respectability of age, such
as the Post Office regulation to this effect." But the answer might
possibly be in the negative if an agency attempted, without any prior
history of such regulations to show the 'presumable blessing of a silent
Congress, for the first time to endow itself with such power, partic-
ularly if the agency attempted to apply such a regulation to a con-
tract in existence prior to its promulgation.
If a particular agency has a valid regulation authorizing termi-
nation for convenience, as distinguished from a default termination,
at the absolute discretion of the Government and excluding recovery
of anticipated profits, the Court of Claims might very well read it
into a disputed contract to supplement the express language of the
contract."
Current regulations concerning the issuance of a termination for
13 Sec the Post Office cases cited note 10 supra. The qualification of "possibly" has
been added to the affirmative answer because these cases also rested on the Post Office
statute and a conclusion that each termination was justified on the facts involved.
14 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, motion for
rehearing and reargument denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied. 376
U.S. 929, motion for leave to file second petition for rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 1010
(1964), cert. denied, Fed. Cont. Rep., Oct. 18, 1965, p. B-1, held that a termination
for convenience of a military contract was valid, though the contract contained no
termination for convenience clause, because the Armed Services Procurement Regulations
in effect as of the time of execution, required a termination for convenience clause, and
the court read in the ASPR clause, thereby excluding the recovery of anticipatory
profits sought by the contractor. The Christian case does not dispose of the subject
matter of this paper, however, because in Christian, the contractor claimed that any
termination was a breach and did not reach the point that, assuming the termination
for convenience clause prescribed by ASPR was in the contract, the particular termina-
tion was not authorized by such clause. A similar incorporation of a termination for
convenience clause, required by a regulation anteceding the date of the contract,
was urged by the concurring minority of four in United States v. Penn Foundry & Mfg.
Co., supra note 3. The Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR), 41 C.F.R. § 1-8.201(b)
(1965), applicable to most agencies (but excluding certain major agencies as Defense,
NASA, and the AEC), state:
However, the power of a contracting activity to issue a termination notice
does not depend on the existence of a termination for convenience clause in
the contract. In the absence of a termination for convenience clause, however,
such action normally constitutes a breach of contract. Such a breach of contract
may subject the Government to liability for common-law damages, including
anticipatory profit, unless the Government arrives at a voluntary settlement
with the contractor.
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convenience of the Government are a far cry from those authorizing
terminations for convenience at the absolute discretion of the Govern-
ment. The Department of Defense prescribes that its contracts shall
be terminated for the convenience of the Government "only when such
action is in the best interest of the Government, as determined in ac-
cordance with Departmental [i.e., military department] procedures.""
The regulations of the Army, Defense Supply Agency, Air Force, and
Navy add nothing of substance to the "best - interest of the Govern-
ment" test." The Federal Procurement Regulations only reiterate the
test of "best interest of the Government"' as does .the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Regulation. 18
The language of - these regulations, applicable to most government
contracts, does no more in fact than repeat the language of the usual
clause, entitled "Termination for Convenience of the Government,"
which authorizes termination only when the contracting officer deter-
mines that such termination is in "the best interest of the Gov-
ernment."" This language does not on its face permit the contracting
officer to terminate a contract at any time with or without justification,
thereby distinguishing the case presented by this termination clause
from those cases in which, under the language of different clauses, the
Government had an absolute and unconditional right to terminate.20
The "best interest of the Government" language in the standard
termination clause permits an examination as to the motives of the
Government, particularly its good faith in issuing a termination for
convenience.'
15 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8.201 (1965).
16 32 C.F.R. § 597.201 (Supp. 1965) (Army) ; 32 C.F.R. § 1008.201 (1965) (Air
Force); 32 C.F.R. § 1208.201 (1965) (Defense Supply Agency). Navy Regulations
are silent as to this specific point.
17 FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-8.201(a)
. (1965).
18
 NASA PR, 41 C.F.R. § 18-8.201 (1965).
16 See clauses cited note 4 supra.
20 RFC v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 200 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1952) (lease terminable
by either party on fifteen days' notice); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 71 F. Supp.
791 (D.D.C. 1947); Maco Warehouse Co. California v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 494
(Ct. Cl. 1959) (lease revocable at will of Secretary of the Army); McNaught v.
United States, 117 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (lease cancellable any March 1 by
thirty days' notice from the Government); Jardine Mining Co. v. United States, 88
F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (absolute right in the Government to cancel without
payment of damages) ; Bailes & Bailes Barber Shop, 65-2 B.CA. 5118 (ASBCA,
Sept. 30, 1965) (concession contract, containing thirty day termination notice provision,
can be terminated by giving of a thirty day notice without necessity of passing on
the reason).
21 Jacobs v. United States, 239 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
904, petition for rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 652 (1957) (termination for convenience
found issued in good faith and for proper reasons); Librach & Cutler v. United States,
147 Ct. Cl. 605 (1959) (Army mistakenly but in good faith believed contract was
in excess of requirements and termination for convenience upheld); see United States
v. Golgra, 312 U.S. 203 (1941) (contract subject to lawful cancellation whenever
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The "best interest of the Government" cannot be served by a
purported termination for convenience when the Government has a
need for the supplies already ordered by the contract. The most recent
case (excluding the 1961-1965 Court of Claims cases to be discussed) 22
in support of this conclusion is Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United
States.' In that case, a unanimous Court of Claims rode rough-shod
over the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. It determined that
a contract provided for binding orders to be issued by a contracting
officer to meet certain needs, construed a telephone conversation by
a government project engineer as a binding order from the contracting
officer to meet the needs, treated a subsequent telephone conversation
by the project engineer as an attempted but futile termination, and
ordered the Government to take and pay the contract prices for all
the supplies prepared by the contractor in reliance on the first tele-
phone conversation (less certain amounts by which the contractor had
mitigated damages). While this decision held that the oral termination
was valid as to supplies not produced by the contractor, on this point
it is distinguishable from a case in which the Government had. con-
tinuing needs for which the contractor bad produced the supplies in
whole or in part. The court felt that a binding obligation under the
contract involved in Ready-Mix was created only when there was both
(i) "need," and (ii) an "order" (which did not have to be issued),
while in the ordinary government supply contract, the condition for
the issuance of an order is not stated.
There have been a series of recent Court of Claims cases which
support the conclusion that when the Government has a continuing
need for the supplies involved, any purported exercise of the termi-
nation for convenience clause would be a breach of contract. Thus,
recently the Court of Claims has repeatedly held that there can be no
termination for convenience when the Government has already
breached the contract by a termination for default, in spite of the
language in the "Default" clause. 24
The reasoning in Klein v. United States25 is especially useful in
considering this point. The court held that there could be no termi-
nation for convenience because the "best interest of the Government"
chief of engineers, rightly or wrongly, but in good faith, determined contractor was
violating its provisions). The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has, however,
recently decided it has no jurisdiction to determine whether a termination for convenience
was arbitrary, capricious and not in good faith. Topeka Janitor Service, 65-2 B.C.A.
if 4911.
22 See pp. 263-65, infra.
23 158 F. Supp. 571 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
24
 Dale Constr. Co. v. United States, No. 134-57, Ct. Cl. Dec. 11, 1964; Goldwasser
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would riot thereby .be served. Its rationale was based on the fact that
deliveries under the repurchase contracts would have been almost a
year later than deliveries under the contract involved, and that the
Government never presented any valid reason for a termination for
convenience.
The reasoning in Klein pertinent to the question under consider-
ation here remains unshaken despite several influences which operate
to weaken the decision. The first such influence is found in Klein itself,
in which there is a dissent from the position that the Government's
purported termination for convenience could not cure a breach for
which the contractor was entitled to damages, including loss of antici-
patory profits. Then, too, some of Klein's language was criticized in
general terms in John Reiner & Co. v. United States," in which the
cancellation of an award which was found to be invalid by a ruling of
the Government Accounting Office was held to be a termination for
convenience, rather than a breach of contract. Further, Reiner was
followed in a similar case decided on the same day, Brown & Son
Elec. Co. v. United States 2 7
However, there are several reasons for considering Klein to be
solid precedent. Among them are:
(1) On the same day as the decisions in Reiner and Brown, Klein
was specifically followed by Goldwasser v. United States.' It has been
followed even more recently by Dale Constr. Co. v. United States.'
(2) While Klein, Reiner, Brown and Goldwasser were decided
by divided courts, there were no dissents in Litchfield Mfg. Co. v.
United States" and Dale Constr. Co. In Litchfield, a contractor was
held entitled to damages for breach, rather than being subject to
compensation limitations under a termination for convenience clause,
when his default was caused by the Government.
{3) Carrier Corp. v. United States" held that the cancellation of
a contract for fraud, after the contractor had purged itself of the fraud,
constituted a breach for which the Government was liable in damages.
This result was consistent with Klein. The case had two dissents, one
of which was based on the theory that the damages were incurred
prior to the purging and the other on the theory that the fraud had
not been purged.
(4) In Reiner itself, the majority opinion very carefully tested
the validity of a termination for convenience and concluded that it
26
 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963)•
27 325 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
28 Supra note 24.
29 supra note 24.
80 338 F.2d 94 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
31




would be in the "best interest of the Government" because it would
minimize a conflict with another arm of the Government, the Govern-
ment Accounting Office. The court observed that the "best interest of
the Government" is a broad phrase, not necessarily tied to a decrease
in the need for the supplies involVed, and also that the contracting
officer's decision to terminate for convenience is conclusive only "in the
absence of bad faith or clear abuse of discretion."
Consequently, on the cases as they stand, a purported exercise of
the termination clause may well be a breach of contract as long as the
Government has need for the products or supplies covered by the
contract."
The above analysis of the cases is consistent with an interpretation
giving full effect to the termination for convenience clause. It some-
times happens that the Schedule of a government contract (i.e., the
particular "tailor-made" provisions, as distinguished from the stan-
dard "boiler-plate") has language which commits the Government to
taking a definite or minimum quantity of the supplies covered by the
contract, though the "boiler-plate" contains the usual termination for
convenience clause. It may be argued that the presence in the Schedule
of provisions committing the Government to a definite or minimum
quantity is so inconsistent with the usual termination for convenience
clause that the latter must be disregarded. This interpretation finds
support in a recent Court of Claims case" in which the court, over-
ruling the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, held that a
clause requiring the Government to order only $100 worth of work
was so inconsistent with the rest of the contract, calling for the repair
of 183 machines, that it must be disregarded.
An interesting example of a situation in which the exercise of the
usual termination for convenience clause could be a breach of contract
is the case in which the contractor executes the contract with the
Government after giving notice to the contracting officer that he will
incur additional financing in reliance upon the contract. If this under-
standing is stated in the Schedule of the contract, it might well be a
helpful factor in reinforcing an interpretation that the termination
for convenience clause may not be used arbitrarily, capriciously or
32 While a conclusion that a termination for convenience may be a breach may have
the appearance of novelty, it is, as shown by the analysis of the cases herein, consider-
ably more conservative than Eastern Service Management Co. v. United States, 11
CCF 80,057 (E.D.S.C. 1965), CCH Gov't Cont. Rep., Report Letter No. 1, Oct. 15,
1965. In that case the court held that the refusal of the contracting officer to grant
an adjustment under the "Changes" clause of a cleaning services contract, to compensate
the contractor for cleaning square footage in excess of the amount stated in the contract,
was a breach. It is believed that the Court of Claims would consider such a refusal
to be, not a breach, but cause for equitable adjustment, enforced by the court, in the
contract price under the "Changes" clause.
33 E. H. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 340 F.2d 358 (Ct. CI. 1965).
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without good faith, and might also reinforce the interpretation that,
until the additional financing has been repaid or otherwise amortized,
the termination for convenience clause would be inconsistent with the
Schedule. Another recent Court of Claims case" held that the fact
that a contractor had advised an unidentified official of the Post Office
Department that, in order to accept a contract for mail transportation
service, he would have to acquire a new vehicle to perform the work
under the contract, did not prevent the exercise of the termination for
convenience clause. This case is probably distinguishable from the
hypothetical case previously stated because the Post Office official
remained unidentified. There was no delineation of the scope of his
authority in contract matters."
While there is an oft-repeated maxim that administrative officers
of the Government cannot settle claims for unliquidated damages, in-
cluding loss of anticipatory profits, and while there is a serious ques-
tion whether administrative Contract Appeals Boards will entertain
jurisdiction of a claim for damages for breach of a contract by termi-
nation, both the Supreme Court and the Comptroller General have
sustained the authority of the contracting officer as such to negotiate
a settlement which constitutes a breach."
While, as has been shown above, there is a very respectable
argument to the effect that the exercise by the Government of the
termination for convenience clause may in certain circumstances be a
84 Cornelius v. United States, supra note 10.
35 The case is also distinguishable because of its express reliance upon the long-
standing Post Office statute and regulation discussed, supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text.
30 In United States v. Corliss . Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1876), a leading
case on the Iaw of terminations in government contracts, the Court sustained a
negotiated settlement of termination of a contract, absent a termination clause, which
constituted a breach of the contract. The report of the case below shows that the
Court of Claims gave judgment for the contractor, enforcing the negotiated settlement,
in spite of a series of prohibitory riders in appropriation acts passed after the execution
of the negotiated settlement, and in spite of the findings of the Government Board
(convened after the execution of the negotiated settlement in the amount of $295,068.40)
that the contractor would have suffered a loss of $31,713.44 if the contract had been
completed and that deduction of the cast to complete would result in a settlement of
approximately $147,000. 10 Ct. CI. 494 (1875). While it is impossible to establish
definitely from the reports of this case in the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court,
it appears likely that the negotiated settlement included loss of anticipatory profits.
The Comptroller General recently relied solely on Corliss Engine in authorizing the
Post Office Department to settle administratively a termination for convenience of a
contract which contained no termination clause. Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-155936
(1965), 10 CCF If 72,916.
Notwithstanding this, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has held
that it has no jurisdiction in a case in which the contract did not contain a termination
clause but was nevertheless terminated by the Government. World Electrical Specialties
Corp., 65-1 BCA if 4679. World Electrical Specialties was preceded by Industrial Preci-
sion Products Co., ASBCA No. 3171 (1956) which held that the Board had no jurisdic-
tion over a termination which was a breach of contract.
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breach of contract, the exceptions to the general rule permitting the
Government to terminate practically at will are narrow and the Gov-
ernment contractor is ordinarily left in a vulnerable position with
respect to expenditures incurred. This is particularly true of expendi-
tures for additional financing in the nature of interest on borrowings
or the cost of a secondary underwriting. Thus a more careful "termi-
nation for convenience" clause should be drawn, one which delineates
much more precisely the circumstances in which the Government can
terminate for convenience, and which permits optional variations in
the "termination for convenience" clause. This could well be the sub-
ject of a "case" for consideration by such administrative agencies as
the Defense Industrial Advisory Committee or the Armed Forces
Procurement Regulation Committee, both of which customarily have
on their agenda "cases" with respect to improving the government
procurement process.
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